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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Moore was charged with felony driving under the influence after officers 
observed him stumbling in the parking lot of the Kit Kat Club. The case proceeded to a 
bifurcated trial where Mr. Moore challenged the use of his prior North Dakota conviction 
for actual physical control as an enhancement because it did not substantially conform 
with Idaho Code section 18-8004 and his plea was taken without his being represented 
by counsel. During the second portion of the bifurcated trial, objections were also made 
to the admission of the North Dakota judgment and bench warrant contained in State's 
Exhibit 4 because they were not certified and the bench warrant was irrelevant. 
Mr. Moore contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his felony 
conviction for driving under the influence because the prior North Dakota misdemeanor 
conviction used to convict him of the felony enhancement was not a substantially 
conforming conviction and his plea was taken without counsel. Furthermore, Mr. Moore 
contends the district court erred in admitting the prior judgment of conviction from North 
Dakota as well as a bench warrant for a probation violation in that case because the 
judgment of conviction was not certified nor authenticated at trial and the bench warrant 
was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 28, 2007 at approximately 7:48pm, Deputy Lim and Deputy Meacham 
were dispatched to the Kit Kat Club in Ada County. (Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.12-14, p.34, L.l 
- p.35, L.11, p.53, Ls.6-10, p.54, Ls.11-25.) According to Deputy Lim, a white Cougar 
was stopped in the middle of the road as he approached with his lights on, so he blew 
his air horn and the car turned into the Kit Kat Club. (Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.12 - p.37, L.lO.) 
At trial Deputy Lim admitted that it was not uncommon for people to stop once they see 
an officer behind them with flashing lights. (Trial Tr., p.47, Ls.6-9.) 
The deputies also testified that they were able to watch the Cougar off and on as 
they responded to their call. Deputy Lim testified that as the Cougar was pulling in he 
looked back at it and "saw the front door open and one person getting out." (Trial 
Tr., p.40, Ls.9-19.) However, he also testified that shortly after that, once they had been 
advised by the Meridian police that they had a handle on the situation he was 
responding to, he saw the occupant of the Cougar "walking towards us or just getting 
out of his car and walking towards us." (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.1-6.) He testified that the 
occupant of the car "was stumbling, seemed to be having some trouble standing up." 
(Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.11-16.) Deputy Lim also admitted that he was walking towards the 
entrance with Mr. Moore behind him when Mr. Moore allegedly exited the car. (Trial 
Tr., p.42, Ls.8-19.) 
According to Deputy Meacham, even as he was responding to the situation they 
were dispatched to, he "kept looking back at the Cougar because the driver never exited 
the vehicle." (Trial Tr., p.58, Ls.6-11.) Deputy Meacham testified that eventually the 
driver exited the car and was stumbling as he was walking towards where the officers 
were located. (Trial Tr., p.58, Ls.18-25.) However he also admitted that he did not 
have his eyes on the Cougar 100 percent of the time and that he was only able to look 
back and forth every 10 to 20 seconds. (Trial Tr., p.77, Ls.6-9, p.80, Ls.12-17.) Both 
deputies identified the driver as Mr. Moore at trial. (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.11-17, p.62, 
Ls.12-16.) 
After Mr. Moore refused to take a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, informing 
officers he had not been driving, Mr. Moore was then arrested for driving under the 
influence after he refused the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (Trial Tr., p.63, L.22 - 
p.64, L.3, p.64, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Moore was taken to the intox room at the Ada County jail 
where he ultimately refused to take a breathalyzer test. (Trial Tr., p.65, L.7 - p.66, L.6.) 
Deputy Meacham later determined that the white Cougar was registered to Mr. Moore. 
(Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.5-14.) Although most of the deputies' interactions with Mr. Moore 
were recorded, deputy Meacham admitted that the entire encounter was not because 
his recorder's battery was not working so he signaled Deputy Lim to turn his on while he 
was talking to Mr. Moore. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.5-21.) 
Mr. Moore was charged by Information with felony operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol (two or more within ten years). (R., pp.19-20.) 
Prior to trial, Mr. Moore filed a Motion in Limine arguing that his prior conviction in North 
Dakota did not substantially comply with the ldaho driving under the influence statute 
and, therefore, this conviction should not be used to enhance his charge to a felony.' 
(R., pp.34-38.) The district court deferred ruling on the motion until after part one of the 
DUI trial was submitted to the jury. (Trial Tr., p.161, Ls.19-25.) The district court 
ultimately denied the motion finding, "the North Dakota statute was substantially 
conforming to the ldaho DUI statute." (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.18-20.) 
' In the motion, counsel for Mr. Moore also argued that Washington's DUI statute was 
also not substantially complying; however, after the motion in limine was filed the State 
explained that it was not a prior Washington DUI conviction that was being used, but a 
prior ldaho DUI conviction. 
While the jury was deliberating on whether Mr. Moore was guilty of driving under 
the influence, counsel for Mr. Moore again objected to the prior judgment from North 
Dakota arguing that on its face it stated that Mr. Moore did not have counsel and it did 
not state that a valid waiver to counsel had been made. (Trial Tr., p.191, L.19 - p.195, 
L.15, p.203, Ls.12-18.) 
Mr. Moore was found guilty of driving under the influence. (R., p.51.) The case 
then proceeded into the second phase where the jury was asked to determine whether 
Mr. Moore had two prior convictions. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.22 - p.202, L.17.) When the 
State sought to admit the prior judgment from North Dakota, defense counsel objected 
stating, "I would make an objection to State's Exhibit 4. 1 don't believe it is on its face a 
valid conviction. Furthermore, there IS no state seal on the conviction itself. And I 
would object to page 3 of the packet itself, in that page 3 is not relevant." (Trial 
Tr., p.203, Ls.11-18.) The court admitted State's exhibit 4, although it did give a limiting 
I 
instruction related to the third page which contained a bench warrant for a probation 
violation, stating that it could only be considered for the limited purpose of proving that 
I 
Mr. Moore has pled guilty or been found guilty of the relevant North Dakota statute and 
I 
I that it was not to be considered as evidence of Mr. Moore's bad character or that he has 
a propensity to commit crimes. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.2-21.) 
I The jury ultimately found Mr. Moore guilty of felony driving under the influence, 
I for having two prior DUl's. (R., pp.49-50.) Mr. Moore was sentenced to six years, with 
I one year fixed. (R., pp.56-58.) Mr. Moore filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.59-61.) 
ISSUES 
1. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict Mr. Moore of felony 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota judgment of conviction 
because it was not certified or authenticated? 
3. Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota bench warrant because it 
was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial? 
ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was lnsufficient To Support The District Court's 
Conviction For Felonv Operatina A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Moore contends that the district court erred in entering a Judgment of 
Conviction for felony DUI due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the district court 
erred in allowing the State to use one of Mr. Moore's prior misdemeanor DUI 
convictions as a basis to seek a conviction of felony DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5). 
Mr. Moore maintains that his North Dakota conviction for actual physical control of a 
vehicle was not a substantially conforming conviction and his guilty plea to this charge 
was invalid because it was obtained without counsel and without a showing that his right 
to counsel was knowingly and voluntarily waived. Therefore, Mr. Moore contends his 
conviction for the felony enhancement is invalid. 
B. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was lnsufficient To Support The District Court's 
Conviction For Felonv Operatina A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of 
Alcohol 
A Judgment of Conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, must be overturned on 
appeal where there lacks substantial competent evidence upon which a reasonable trier 
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the 
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 
561, 562, 21 P.3d 498, 499 (2001); Sfate v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 219, 953 P.2d 650, 
659 (Ct. App. 1998). On appellate review, the significance of the evidence will not be 
reweighed as it relates to the specific elements of the crime, instead the Court will 
examine the supporting evidence. Sfate v. Thomas, 133 ldaho 172, 174, 938 P.2d 245, 
247 (Ct. App. 1999). When reviewing the evidence for sufficiency to support the verdict, 
the reviewing Court will review all of the trial evidence, including testimony presented by 
the defendant. Sfafe v. Brown, 131 ldaho 61, 71, 951 P.2d 1288, 1298 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Additionally, the Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. 
State v. Glass, 139 ldaho 815, 818, 87 P.3d 302, 305 (2004). 
Here, Mr. Moore contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
convict him of felony driving under the influence because his conviction for actual 
physical control in North Dakota was not substantially conforming to the ldaho driving 
under the influence statute and his conviction was obtained without the advice and 
consent of counsel or a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel; therefore, 
the North Dakota conviction should not have been used to enhance Mr. Moore's driving 
under the influence conviction to a felony. 
1. The North Dakota Statute Was Not Substantiallv Conforming With ldaho 
Code S 18-8004 
The determination of whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially 
conforming is a question of law over which the ldaho appellate courts exercise free 
review. I.C. § 18-8005(8); Sfafe v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 
2007). ldaho Code section 18-8005(5) provides that anyone who has pled guilty to or 
been found guilty of driving under the influence in ldaho Code 3s 18-8004(l)(a),(b), or 
(c) and who has previously been found guilty or pled guilty two or more times to $is 18- 
8004(l)(a),(b), or (c), or "any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation" is 
convicted of a felony and subject to up to a ten year sentence. I.C. 18-8005(5). ldaho 
Code 3 18-8005(8) goes on to state, "a substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation exists when a person has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a violation 
of any federal law or law of another state, or any valid county, city, or town ordinance of 
another state substantially conforming to the provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho 
Code." I.C. § 18-8005(8). Therefore "[tlhe elements of the violation in each state must 
substantially conform to each other." Schmoll, 144 ldaho at 803, 172 P.3d at 558 
(stating "[tlhe legislature expressly provided that the focus of the comparison should be 
on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the prior 
vio~ation").~ 
In State v. Schmoll, the ldaho Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether 
the defendant's felony driving under the influence conviction under the applicable 
Montana Statute was substantially conforming with the ldaho statute. 144 ldaho at 803- 
04, 172 P.3d at 558-59. In doing so, the Court analyzed cases from several 
jurisdictions dealing with substantially complying statutes. Id. at 801-03, 172 P.3d at 
556-58. The Court ultimately found that the elements of "under the influence" were 
substantially conforming, noting that Montana's higher standard "surpasses the 
elements required for a violation in ldaho;" therefore, a violation in Montana would 
Notably, when other jurisdiction have dealt with the federal constitutionality of the 
district court's finding that a foreign conviction is under a substantially similar statute, 
they have stated that although the legal comparison between statutes does not violate 
the defendant's right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 
and Shepad v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), if the district court goes beyond the 
elements to look at whether the specific facts of the case were substantially conforming 
the defendant's federal constitutional right to a jury trial may be implicated. See Stafe v. 
Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250, 623 S.E.2d 600 (2006) (citing Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13 (2005)); In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 111 P.3d 837 
(2005). 
always be a violation in ldaho. Id. at 804, 172 P.3d at 559. The Court then looked at 
whether the fact the Montana conviction would not have been a felony made the 
conviction not substantially similar finding, "a foreign conviction where the elements of 
the statute are essentially congruous with Idaho's prohibition, and which is punished as 
a felony, satisfies the requirements for enhancement to a felony charge in ldaho." Id. at 
805, 172 P.3d at 560. 
Notably, the Court in Schmoll also articulated that the result may not be the same 
under the standard applied if it was a Montana Court looking at whether the ldaho 
statute substantially complied, citing United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 198 (4'h 
Cir. 2004). Id. at 804 n.1, 172 P.3d at 559 n. I. In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that under Virginia law, "[a] Statute is substantially similar if any actions 
violating the statute necessarily would violate the Virginia statute as well" and that it is 
the State's burden to prove that a prior conviction was under a conforming statute. 
Thomas, 367 F.3d at 198 (citing Turner v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 851, 568 S.E.2d 
468,472 (2002); Shinaulf v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 269, 321 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1984)). 
Like Thomas, this case presents the inverse problem as that presented in Schmoll. 
Although Mr. Moore was charged with being in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
under the influence in North Dakota, he might not have been guilty of driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence in ldaho because (1) 
Idaho's definition of actual physical control is much narrower, (2) in North Dakota one 
can commit the offense on private property, and (3) in North Dakota if the defendant's 
BAC level is between .05 and the legal limit the defendant can still be prosecuted for 
driving or being in actual physical control while under the influence. 
a. North Dakota's Definition Of Actual Physical Control Is Much 
Broader Than Idaho's 
First, Mr. Moore contends that actual physical control under the North Dakota 
statute is much broader than ldaho Code fj  18-8004(5). The elements of the ldaho and 
North Dakota driving under the influence statutes are not substantially similar when it is 
a matter of being in "actual physical control" of a vehicle. (See State's Exhibit 4, p.2.) 
Although both ldaho code section 18-8004 and North Dakota code section 39-08-01 
provide that it is unlawful to drive "or be in actual physical control" of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, ldaho Code rj  18-8004(5) specifically states that 
actual physical control "shall be defined as being in the driver's position of the motor 
vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving." I.C. fj 18-8004(1)(a) & 
(5); N.D. fj  39-08-01 (1). Although the applicable North Dakota code does not contain a 
definition of "actual physical control" the term has been construed much broader in 
North Dakota prohibiting "any exercise of dominion or control over a vehicle by an 
intoxicated person." Hawes v. NorN7 Dakota Dept. of Transp., 741 N.W.2d 202, 205-06 
(N.D. 2007). 
Furthermore, unlike ldaho, which considers physical control another means of 
committing driving under the influence, North Dakota has found actual physical control 
to be a separate, lesser offense, from driving under the influence. Compare State v. 
Cheney, 116 ldaho 917, 919, 782 P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that driving 
under the influence and being in actual physical control are not separate offenses, but 
rather, "alternative 'circumstances' under which the crime of driving under the influence 
may be charged") with State v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791, 794-96 (1996). (stating that 
"[dlespite appearing in the same statute, DUI and APC [actual physical control] are 
different offenses" and finding that actual physical control is a lesser included of offense 
of DUI.) Here, the complaint specifically charged Mr. Moore with being in actual 
physical control while under the influence. (State's Exhibit 4, p.2.) 
In North Dakota convictions for being in actual physical control have been upheld 
when a person was "passed out in the driver's seat of her vehicle with the keys in the 
ignition" and the car was reportedly out of gas. See Hawes, at 203-06. They have also 
been upheld where the defendant was found asleep in a vehicle in a parking lot with the 
keys in his coat pocket. City of Fargo v. Theusch, 462 N.W.2d 162,163-64 (N.D. 1990). 
Finally, they were upheld where the defendant was found stretched out asleep in the 
front seat with her head on the passenger side, the keys were in the ignition with the 
heater on and radio playing, but the engine was not running. City of Fargo v. 
Komulianen, 466 N.W.2d 610, 611-12 (N.D. 1991); see also Sfafe v. Haverluk, 617 
N.W.2d 652 ("We have frequently upheld APC [actual physical control] conviction even 
when the vehicles were inoperable or the operator had no intent to drive."); Salvaggio v. 
N.D. Depf. of Trans., 477 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1991) (upholding conviction for actual 
physical control where defendant was outside of the car putting chains on tires, and 
admitting to officers he had been driving and misjudged the corner while making the 
turn); State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252 (N.D. 1977) (upholding conviction for actual 
physical control where defendant was standing outside his car with the keys in his 
hands, but admitted he had been driving). 
Therefore, the North Dakota definition of actual physical control is much broader 
than what is specified in 1daho.code section 18-8004. Thus, the statutes are not 
substantially conforming because what would be considered "actual physical control" in 
North Dakota would not necessarily be considered "actual physical control" in Idaho. 
b. Under The Applicable North Dakota Statutes, Driving Under The 
Influence Or Actual Physical Control Can Be Committed On Private 
Property 
Additionally, in North Dakota one can be convicted for driving under the influence 
or being in actual physical control on private property as well as on state highways, 
whereas ldaho has narrowed private property to "private property open to the public" 
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). Compare State v. Knott, 132 ldaho 476, 974 P.2d 1105 (1999) 
(finding defendant parked in residential driveway was not parked on private property 
open to the public) with Brewer v. Ziegler, 743 N.W.2d 391, 396 (N.D. 2007) (finding 
defendant could be arrested for being in actual physical control where the vehicle was 
located in a private parking lot). In construing where a person can be convicted of 
driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has held that North Dakota code section 39-08-01 must be construed together with 
North Dakota Code section 39-10-01 which provides that provisions relating to driving 
under the influence apply "on highways and elsewhere." Wiederholt v. N.D. Dept of 
Transp., 462 N.W.2d 445,447-51 (N.D. 1990); N.D. 3 39-10-01. 
North Dakota has construed the term "on highways and elsewhere" to include all 
private property, despite the fact the section 39-08-01 specifies private property open to 
the public. Id. Therefore, in North Dakota one can be convicted for driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle even if that vehicle is on private property not open to 
the public. Id.; Brewer v. Ziegler, 743 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 2007); Fetzer v. N.D. Dept of 
Transp., 474 N.W. 2d 71 (N.D. 1991) (reversing district court's finding that there was no 
crime of actual physical control where the offense was committed on private property 
the defendant's pickup was sitting on dirt hills in a residential development about 10 to 
15 feet from the paved roadway because actual physical control can be committed on 
private property.); State v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 1983) (finding that 39-08-01 
and 39-10-01 construed together prohibit a person from being in actual physical control 
on private property or state highways where vehicle was located on a private farmyard.). 
Because North Dakota's determination of where one can be guilty of driving or 
being in actual physical control while under the influence of alcohol is again broader 
than that in Idaho, the North Dakota statute is not substantially complying. 
c. North Dakota Allows For The Prosecution Of Drivins Or Actual 
Physical Control While Under The Influence Even If The 
Defendant's BAC Test Is Below The Legal Limit 
Finally, North Dakota allows a defendant to still be prosecuted for driving under 
the influence or being in actual physical control if a defendant's blood alcohol content is 
above .05 but below the legal limit. Under North Dakota Code 3 39-20-07 a person with 
a blood alcohol content not more that .05 percent is automatically presumed to not be 
under the influence. N.D. § 39-20-07(1). However, a blood alcohol content over ,051 is 
considered relevant evidence of driving under the influence "but is not to be given prima 
facie effect." N.D. § 39-20-07(2); See also State v. Engebrefson, 326 N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 
1982) (upholding conviction of defendant for driving under the influence with a blood 
alcohol content of .07, which was below the legal limit) overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Himmerick, 499 N.W.2d 568 (1993).) A person having a blood alcohol content 
of . I0 percent or higher is considered to be under the influence of alcohol. N.S. § 39- 
20-07(2) (1999)~ Whereas, in ldaho a person with a blood alcohol content below .08 
cannot be prosecuted for driving under the influence, unless they are also under the 
influence of drugs, driving a commercial vehicle, or are a minor. I.C. § 18-8004(2); 
Sfate v. Mils, 128 ldaho 426 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Therefore, unlike ldaho, an individual in North Dakota can still be prosecuted and 
convicted of driving under the influence or being in actual physical control even if their 
blood alcohol content is below the legal limit. This broader application of the blood 
alcohol content tests also results in the North Dakota statue not being complying with 
ldaho code section 18-8004. 
d. Conclusion 
Because the North Dakota elements for driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while intoxicated are not substantially conforming with ldaho, and would 
allow convictions in much broader circumstances than in ldaho, the district court erred 
in denying Mr. Moore's motion in limine and allowing the North Dakota conviction to be 
used to enhance Mr. Moore's DUI to a felony. Furthermore, because the district court 
erroneously admitted this conviction for the jury's consideration and without it the State 
would have only presented one prior misdemeanor, Mr. Moore cannot be found guilty of 
the offense of felony DUI. As such, Mr. Moore asserts that the prosecution failed to 
present substantial competent evidence at the time of trial to allow the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of felony driving under the influence. 
At the time of his conviction in North Dakota, $j 39-20-07 provided that a blood alcohol 
content of . I0 percent was considered under the influence; however, in 2003 this 
section was amended so it now states a blood alcohol content of .08 percent is under 
the influence. See N.D. $j 39-20-07 (2009); ND Legis ch. 316 (H.B. No. 1161) (2003). 
2. Mr. Moore's Guiltv Plea In North Dakota Was Obtained Without A Knowinq 
Voluntarv Waiver Of His Riqht To Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right 
to counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 
(2004). A plea hearing qualifies as a "critical stage." Id. (citing White v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 59, 60 (1963)). The purpose of the constitutional right to counsel "is to protect an 
accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional 
rights." Johnson v. Zerbsf, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). Nowhere is counsel more 
important than at a plea proceeding: "[A]n intelligent assessment of the relative 
advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an 
attorney." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n. 6 (1970). Because a guilty plea 
serves as a conviction and relieves the state of its burden of proof in a criminal case, 
ensuring the validity of the plea is of vital importance. Von Molfke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 
708, 719 (1948). 
However, a person accused of a crime may choose to decline representation. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87. Although a defendant has a constitutional right to represent 
himself, in order to do so he must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. 
Id. at 87-88; United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir.1987). Where the 
State charges a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, it bears the burden of 
making a "prima facie showing of the validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a 
pending crime." State v. Warren, 135 ldaho 836, 840, 25 P.3d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(quoting State v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 294, 955 P.2d 603,609 (Ct. App.1997)). 
In order to make the required showing, the State is only obligated to prove the 
existence of the convictions through copies of the judgments of conviction or other 
evidence. State v. Coby, 128 ldaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 (1996). Once the State 
has met its burden, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with some 
evidence that the conviction was constitutionally defective. Id. However, if the 
defendant raises a triable issue of fact that the defendant was not accorded ail of their 
rights on the previous convictions, the burden is then on the State to rebut the 
defendant's evidence and prove there were no constitutional infirmities. Miller, 131 
ldaho at 295, 955 P.2d at 610; State v. Beloit, 123 ldaho 36, 37, 844 P.2d 18, 19 
(1 992). 
In Cusfis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994), the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defendant's due process right to collaterally attack a conviction used 
for sentencing enhancement purposes in a later proceeding is limited to violations of the 
right to counsel. Custis, 51 1 U.S. at 496. In State v. Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 
(2004), the ldaho Supreme Court chose to follow this holding, finding that the ldaho 
Constitution did not afford greater protections to challenges to the prior convictions. 
Weber, 140 ldaho at 94-96, 90 P.3d at 319-21. Therefore, a defendant can only attack 
his prior conviction based on the fact it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. 
Id. at 92-93, 90 P.3d at 317-18. In Weber, the Court found the failure to comply with 
ldaho criminal Rule I l(c) alone did not provide an independent basis to attack a prior 
conviction as it previously had. Id. at 95, 90 P.3d at 320. 
In Iowa v. Tovar, the United States Supreme Court again visited this issue to 
determine what warnings must be given to a defendant if he pled guilty without counsel 
for his prior conviction to be used as an enhancement. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 8 7 - ~ 4 . ~  The 
Court ultimately found that the warnings given in Tovar prior to accepting the 
defendant's pro se guilty plea were adequate and not required by the Federal 
Constitution stating, "the States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides 
to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful." Id, at 93-94. The Court 
ultimately held that the Sixth Amendment requirement of a "knowing and intelligent" 
waiver of counsel "is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of 
the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the 
range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." Id. at 81. 
Here, Mr. Moore contends that he raised a triable issue of fact that his previous 
North Dakota DUI conviction was illegally obtained in violation of his right to counsel. 
While the jury was deliberating on the first part of the bifurcated trial, counsel for 
Mr. Moore noted that she had an objection to the admission of the North Dakota 
judgment of conviction based on the fact that on its face the judgment only stated that 
Mr. Moore appeared without counsel and cited State v. Mesenbrink, 115 ldaho 850, 771 
P.2d 514 (1989) and Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 90 P.3d 314. (Trial Tr., p.191, L.19 - p.195, 
L.15. In making her argument, counsel noted that Weber held that you could only 
collaterally attack a prior judgment based on the denial of counsel and here, although 
there was no indication on the face of the judgment that he was denied his right to 
counsel, it does indicate that he appeared without counsel and likewise there was no 
indication that he was advised of his right to counsel or waived his right to counsel. 
Although Weber was decided approximately a month after Tovar, the ldaho Supreme 
Court made no mention of Tovarin its decision. See Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 
generally. 
(Trial Tr., p.194, L.10 - p.195, L.4; State's Exhibit 4, p.1.) The North Dakota judgment 
of conviction only stated "the above-named defendant appeared in person without 
counsel." (State's Exhibit 4, p.1.) 
Mr. Moore contends that because the judgment of conviction only indicates that 
he appeared without counsel and does not indicate that he waived his right to counsel 
or was advised of his right to counsel, it demonstrates on its face that there was a 
triable issue regarding whether he was denied his right to counsel prior to entering his 
plea. (See State's Exhibit 4, p.1.) Therefore his North Dakota misdemeanor DUI 
conviction is invalid, and Mr. Moore could not have committed the offense of felony DUI. 
Furthermore, even if this Court determines that the State was not provided an 
opportunity by the district court to rebut the defense argument that this conviction was 
invalid, the case should, at the very least be remanded for further factual findings on this 
issue because Mr. Moore presented a triable issue regarding whether he was denied 
his right to counsel. 
The District Court Erred In Admittina The North Dakota Judqment Of Conviction 
Because It Was Not Certified Or Authenticated 
Mr. Moore contends the district court erred in admitting the North Dakota 
Judgment of Conviction because it was not certified. At the bifurcated trial, during the 
felony portion of the trial, counsel for Mr. Moore objected to the admission of State's 
Exhibit 4 stating "there is no state seal on the conviction itself." (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.15- 
16.) Earlier the State had argued that the "the middle page bears the certification for 
the judgment and documents attached." (Trial Tr., p.163, Ls.6-12.) However, the 
certification was a simple stamp certifying that particular document, rather than a 
certification for all the documents contained in State's Exhibit 4 as the State asserted. 
(See State's Exhibit 4.) 
Originally, ldaho Code § 9-312 provided that a judicial record of another state or 
territory "may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court 
annexed, if there be a clerk and seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or 
presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form." I.C. § 9-312; see also Sfafe v. 
Johnson, 86 ldaho 51, 58, 383 P.2d 326, 333 (1963) (noting that on remand the 
admissibility of judicial records of other courts should be determined pursuant to the 
requirements of 3 9-312.) 
After Johnson, the ldaho Rules of Evidence were adopted requiring 
authentication of evidence and proscribing how this should be done. Under ldaho Rule 
of Evidence 901, prior to being admitted the item must be authenticated or identified by 
"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims." I.R.E. 901(b). However, a public record can be self-authenticating if it meets 
certain requirements under ldaho Rule of Evidence 902. I.R.E. 902. In fact, I.R.E. 
902(4) specifically provides that a copy of a public document is self authenticating if it is 
certified stating: 
A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct 
by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by 
certificate complying with paragraph (I), (2), or (3) of this rule or 
complying with any law of the United States or of this State, or rule 
prescribed by the ldaho Supreme Court. 
I.R.E. 902(4). Therefore to be self-authenticating a copy of a public record must bear a 
certification that the item is a correct copy. I.R.E. 902(4). 
Here, the only copy certified in State's exhibit 4, was the second page which 
contained the North Dakota complaint. (State's Exhibit 4.) Neither the judgment of 
conviction nor the bench warrant contained on pages I and 3 contained any 
certification. (State's Exhibit 4.) Furthermore, no evidence was presented at trial by the 
State authenticating the copy pursuant to I.R.E. 901. Therefore, the district court erred 
in admitting the North Dakota judgment because it was not a certified copy. 
Furthermore, Mr. Moore contends that this error was not harmless. An error in 
the admission of evidence is harmless "if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the error. 
Sfafe v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 879, 11 P.3d 494, 498 (Ct. App. 2000.) Here, the first 
page of State's Exhibit 4 was the judgment of conviction, which proved that Mr. Moore 
had previously pled guilty to drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence. (State's Exhibit 4.) Therefore, the State would not have been 
able to obtain their conviction for felony driving under the influence absent this 
document and its erroneous admission cannot be said to be harmless. 
The District Court Erred Bv Allowing The State To Admit Into Evidence A Bench 
Warrant For Probation Violation To Prove Mr. Moore Had Two Prior Drivina Under The 
Influence Convictions Because The Bench Warrant Was Not Relevant And Its 
Preiudicial Effect Substantially Outweiahed Its Probative Value 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the State to admit into evidence a copy of 
a bench warrant for a probation violation in Mr. Moore's North Dakota case because it 
was not relevant and its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value it 
had. Moreover, given its prejudicial nature and the fact the State referred to the 
substance of the bench warrant, its admission was not harmless, even given the district 
court's limiting instruction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of relevancy is a question of law; therefore, an appellate 
court's standard of review on issues of relevance is de novo. State v. Lamphere, 130 
ldaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d l ,  3 (1996) (citation omitted). However, the district court's 
determination that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scovell, 136 ldaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
C. The District Court Erred By Allowina The State To Admit A Bench Warrant For A 
Probation Violation In Mr. Moore's North Dakota Case 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. If the court finds that the evidence is 
relevant and material as to an issue of fact, the court must then determine whether the 
possible prejudice that might inure to the defendant by admission of the evidence is 
outweighed by its probative value. I.R.E. 403; Stafe v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 807 P.2d 
Here, during the second part of the trial, as part of State's Exhibit 4, the State 
sought, and was allowed, to admit a bench warrant in Mr. Moore's North Dakota case 
alleging Mr. Moore had violated his probation, over defense counsel's relevance 
objection. (Trial Tr., p.203, L.3 - p.205, L.6; State's Exhibit 4, p.3.) When admitting 
page three, the Court stated "I'm going to overrule the objection to State's exhibit 4, but 
I am going to give a limiting instruction on the third page of the exhibit." (Trial Tr., p.204, 
Ls.2-5.) The court when on to state: 
With respect to the document attached as page 3 of Exhibit 4, I'm 
going to remind the jury that sometimes exhibits and testimony are 
admitted for a limited purpose. This exhibit, particularly page 3 of the 
exhibit, is admitted for the limited purpose for which it is offered, and that 
is to prove that the defendant Mr. Moore had pled guilty to or had been 
found guilty of a violation of the relevant North Dakota statute that the 
court has previously found is significantly similar to the ldaho DUI statute. 
You're not to consider it for any other purpose other than that. 
You're not to consider it as evidence that the defendant is of a bad 
character or has the propensity to commit crimes. That wouldn't be proper 
for you to find that-for you to consider this exhibit for that purpose. 
You're only to consider this portion for he document for the limited 
purpose of proving the identity, because the state has the burden of proof 
on that issue. 
(Trial Tr., p.204, L.9 - p.205, L.4.) 
However, the district erred in admitting the bench warrant because any relevance 
it had was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The bench warrant stated 
specifically that it appeared that Mr. Moore had not completed the terms of his sentence 
as ordered and specifically stated he had failed to "pay a fineladministrative fee in the 
amount of $100" and he had failed to "[c]omplete an alcohol or drug evaluation and file 
proof with the court." (State's Exhibit 4, p.3.) Admitting allegations that a defendant has 
violated his probation, even if it is in the context of the second part of the bifurcated 
felony DUI trial, indicates to the jury that the defendant is of bad character and cannot 
even properly complete his probation. Furthermore, although the bench warrant did 
have Mr. Moore's birth date and social security number on it; both of these items were 
already contained in the certified citation admitted as part of State's Exhibit 4. (State's 
Exhibit 4, pp.2-3.) Therefore any value the bench warrant had was duplicative and 
already demonstrated through the other two documents contained in State's Exhibit 4. 
(State's Exhibit 4.) Therefore, the prejudicial effect of this document outweighed any 
probative value it had and it should not have been admitted. 
D. The District Court's Error Cannot Be Harmless 
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that, "any error, defect, irregularity, or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." In State v. Seiffec 127 
ldaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995), the ldaho Supreme Court stated for error to be 
harmless, "'we must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."' 
Id. at 358, 900 P.2d at 1369. It cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
admission of the bench warrant in this case was not harmless, even considering the 
Court's limiting instruction. As noted above in section (C), the bench warrant indicated 
that Mr. Moore had not attended treatment or paid his fines. (State's Exhibit 4.) This 
indicates to the jury that after previously being convicted of DUI, Mr. Moore did not 
follow the court's orders, indicating further his possible bad character. Therefore, the 
error in admitting the bench warrant was not harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction for felony driving 
under the influence be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
conviction for the felony enhancement. Alternatively, he contends that his judgment of 
conviction be vacated and his case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
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